

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION

Name: Negron, Michael

DIN: 00-A-1721

Facility: Wende CF

AC No.: 04-130-20 B

Findings: (Page 1 of 3)

Appellant challenges the April 2020 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a 12-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant stabbing the victim with a steak knife in the chest, upper arms, and back, causing severe internal bleeding and injuries. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board failed to consider all of the supportive documentation in Appellant's parole packet; 2) the decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Board failed to consider and properly weigh the required statutory factors; 2) the Board relied on a Tier III infraction despite the fact Appellant was acquitted of the related criminal charges; 3) the Board focused on the crimes of conviction and Appellant's disciplinary record; and 4) the Board falsely concluded that Appellant continues to avoid responsibility for his actions.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted "merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate's institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, "the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary." Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board's discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

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Findings: (Page 2 of 3)

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Assault in the second degree committed while on parole supervision; Appellant's criminal history including two prior state terms of incarceration and multiple parole violations; Appellant's uneven rehabilitation efforts featuring a poor disciplinary record including a Tier III infraction since his last interview and refusal of required programming; and release plans to live with his sister and work for a friend in the seafood business. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, a letter from the District Attorney, and Appellant's parole packet including letters of support.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, committed while on parole supervision and representing a continuation of Appellant's criminal history, Appellant's poor disciplinary record, and Appellant's failure to complete required programming. See Matter of Jones v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 151 A.D.3d 1622, 57 N.Y.S.3d 265 (4th Dept. 2017); Matter of Kenefick v. Sticht, 139 A.D.3d 1380, 31 N.Y.S.3d 367 (4th Dept. 2016); Matter of Byas v. Fischer, 120 A.D.3d 1586-87, 1586, 992 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013); Matter of Jones v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505, 506 (3rd Dept. 2019); Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018). The Board also cited the COMPAS instrument's elevated scores for history of violence and reentry substance abuse. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). Appellant's responses regarding his disciplinary record and drug use concerned the panel, as did Appellant's failure to accept responsibility for his actions. Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017).

Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider supporting documentation and the requisite factors, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).

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That the Board relied on a Tier III infraction despite the fact Appellant was acquitted of the related criminal charges does not provide a basis to disturb the decision. A review of the record reveals the disciplinary infraction was not reversed at the facility level. Furthermore, during the interview Appellant conceded that he had in fact engaged in the serious behavior leading to the ticket – climbing the fence at Midstate Correctional Facility in an attempt to force a transfer to a maximum-security facility. (Tr. at 7.)

Inasmuch as Appellant disputes the Board's finding that he continues to avoid responsibility for his actions, it was well within the Board's authority to make an assessment of Appellant's credibility (Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff'd, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602 (2008)) and there is record support. The interview transcript reflects an inability and/or unwillingness to accept responsibility for his poor disciplinary record. Appellant also stated that the only reason he hasn't used drugs recently is because he can't afford it. (Tr. at 9.)

Recommendation: Affirm.